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The term ‘locality’ is used in different contexts with different meanings. There have been claims
that relational quantum mechanics is local, but it is not clear then how it accounts for the effects
that go under the usual name of quantum non-locality. The present article shows that the failure of
‘locality’ in the sense of Bell, once interpreted in the relational framework, reduces to the existence
of a common cause in an indeterministic context. In particular, there is no need to appeal to a
mysterious space-like influence to understand it.
I. NOTIONS OF LOCALITY
It has often been argued that non-locality is a funda-
mental feature of the world that quantum mechanics has
unveiled [1, 2], but it is not clear what this means pre-
cisely. The term ‘locality’ is used in different contexts
with different meanings. One encounters at least five dif-
ferent notions of ‘locality’ in the literature:
1. No superluminal signalling: signals cannot propa-
gate faster than light;
2. No superluminal causal influence: causes and ef-
fects of events are no further away than permitted
by the velocity of light;
3. No space-like influence: space-like separated quan-
tum systems do not influence each other;
4. Point-like interaction: quantum systems (or fields
of the Lagrangian in quantum field theory) interact
only at the same point in spacetime;
5. Local commutativity: space-like separated local ob-
servables commute.
Of course, these various notions can be very close to one
another. Sometimes, they are even seen as equivalent,
but in the following we will see them as distinct notions,
whose meaning will be clarified in due course.
In the 1970s John Bell proposed a precise mathemati-
cal formalisation of the principle that we called above ‘no
superluminal causal influence’. This formal definition,
which originally goes under the name of ‘local causality’,
is a crucial step toward the proof of his famous theo-
rem [3]. When people say that EPR-type experiments
highlight the fundamental non-locality of nature, they
implicitly refer to that peculiar notion of locality.
In the context of the relational interpretation of quan-
tum mechanics [4], there have been claims that quantum
mechanics becomes local [5]. It is not clear, however, how
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this presumed ‘locality’ has to deal with the original def-
inition of Bell. Surely, the relational interpretation must
have a way to include the effects that go under the usual
name of quantum non-locality. This has been recently
pointed out as one of the open problems of the relational
interpretation [6].
The present article proposes a reinterpretation of the
mathematical definition of locality in the light of rela-
tional quantum mechanics, and clarifies in what sense
relational quantum mechanics can be said to be local.
In section II we review the notion of ‘local causality’
and its mathematical definition introduced by Bell. In
section III we see that this definition still makes sense in
the relational interpretation, but its meaning changes to
the point that there is nothing more surprising in non-
locality than in the fundamental randomness of quantum
mechanics.
II. IS QUANTUM MECHANICS LOCALLY
CAUSAL?
The failure of local determinism
For John Bell, a theory is said to be locally determin-
istic if the state of physical systems in a bounded region
of space-time A can be entirely deduced from the knowl-
edge of the state of systems in another bounded region B
located inside the past light-cone of A [1]. One can say
for instance that Maxwell’s theory of electromagnetism is
locally deterministic, because one can predict the config-
uration of electromagnetic fields in a bounded regions of
spacetime A knowing the configuration of the fields over a
time-slice of the past light-cone of A. A counter-example
is quantum mechanics, which is not locally deterministic.
It is important to notice that all the indeterminism
of quantum mechanics lies in the measurement process.
If one restricts to the unitary evolution, given by the
Schro¨dinger equation, then the evolution is deterministic
(and even more deterministic than in classical mechanics
as pointed out by John Earman [7]). But once a measure-
ment takes place, the future outcome is not determined
by past measurements.
Nevertheless, even if the past does not completely de-
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2termine the future, there might still be some sense in
which one could say that ‘the future is only influenced
by past (and not by spatially separated events)’. This is
another way to state what we previously called the princi-
ple of ‘no superluminal causal influence’. In this way, the
notion of locality first appears as an attempt to preserve
the intuitive notions of cause and effect in an indeter-
ministic context. John Bell proposed a formalisation of
this idea that he called ‘local causality’. Importantly for
what follows, this definition relies on the notion of ‘local
beables’. As we shall argue below, quantum non-locality
is strictly connected to what we count as local beable.
Local beables
Although the notion of beables seems to refer to a pe-
culiar interpretation of quantum mechanics, or even a
new theory (one of the first papers by Bell was entitled,
maybe misleadingly, The theory of local beables [1]), the
concept is meaningful in ordinary quantum mechanics.
To put it in a nutshell, the term ‘beable’ is a fancy way
to say ‘element of reality’. John Bell has been more or
less explicit about what he really meant:
The beables of the theory are those elements
which might correspond to elements of reality,
to things which exist. Their existence does
not depend on ‘observation’. [8]
It was a surprise of quantum mechanics to realise that
some very intuitive concepts like ‘the position of a par-
ticle’ may simply not be meaningful in the absence of
an observation. Reality seemed to fade suddenly. The
introduction of the concept of ‘beable’ was an attempt
to bring back to the theory the primacy of ‘things which
really are in the world’ over ‘things which are observed’
(observable). Thus, the concept of beable strongly de-
pends on a certain form of realism, which might first
seem to be too restrictive for a good interpretation of
quantum mechanics. Is it indeed very reasonable to as-
sume the existence of ‘elements of reality’ in the quantum
world?
In fact, this apparent drawback can be turned into
an advantage if beables are seen as a very general con-
cept whose actual content depends on the choice of the
interpretation. The ontology of quantum mechanics is
not given a priori by its mathematical formalism, but
it is expected from the interpretation to supplement the
mathematics and to answer the question ‘what is real?’
or equivalently ‘what does physically exist?’. The answer
to these questions constitutes the actual content of the
term ‘beable’, which is thus a word whose precise mean-
ing may change with the various possible ontologies of
quantum mechanics.
Different interpretations may agree on some of the ba-
sic things that should be considered as ‘real’. For in-
stance, John Bell suggested that:
The beables must include the settings of
switches and knobs on experimental equip-
ment, the current in coils, and the reading of
instruments. ‘Observables’ are made, some-
how, out of beables. [1]
In the following, we will focus on local beables, that
is to say on beables that are localized in a bounded re-
gion of spacetime. For this to be meaningful, spacetime
is assumed to be the classical spacetime of special rel-
ativity, upon which ‘elements of reality’ can live. This
is not surprising since it is what is usually assumed in
ordinary quantum mechanics or in quantum field theory,
but one should note that it is still unclear what ‘local be-
able’ would mean in a context of quantum gravity where
spacetime itself would be considered as a quantum field.
The notion of local beables, which we have just seen to
be quite flexible, is the basic concept for Bell’s formalisa-
tion of the principle of ‘no superluminal causal influence’
according to which causes and effects cannot propagate
faster than light.
Local causality
Let us denote {x|y} the probability of some particular
value x of the beable X, knowing the particular value y
of the beable Y . Let A and B be two space-like separated
beables, Λ be the set of beables in their common past,
and N (resp. M) the set of beables in the past of A (resp.
B) excluding Λ (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: Spacetime diagram showing the localisation of the
beables A,B, Λ, N and M .
Then the theory is said to be locally causal if, for all
possible values a, λ, n, b of the beables A,Λ, N and B, we
have
{a|λ, n, b} = {a|λ, n} . (1)
In words, it means that knowing the value of the beable
B does not add any new information that would not be
already contained in the beables of the past cone of A.
Quantum mechanics is not locally causal.
Bell emphasized that quantum mechanics is not locally
causal. To see it, consider a radioactive particle in the
3region Λ. The radioactive decay will lead to the emission
of an α particle. Suppose the beables A and B are the
reading of Geiger counters which tell us whether an α
particle is detected (value 1) or not (value 0). Suppose
also that the radioactive particle can only emit at most
one α particle. Knowing only the values Λ = λ and
N = n, it is impossible to predict if A will detect an α
particle or not: it is the randomness of the measurement
process. So whatever the value a ∈ {0, 1} of the beable
A, we have
{a|λ, n} = 1
2
.
Now, if B detects an α particle, A will not, and so:
{A = 1|λ, n,B = 1} = 0.
Thus, in this scenario, we have exhibited a case where:
{a|λ, n, b} 6= {a|λ, n} .
Hence quantum mechanics is not locally causal.
One sees that it is not necessary to introduce EPR
pairs to show that ordinary quantum mechanics (as-
sumed complete) is not locally causal. In fact, Einstein,
Podolsky and Rosen developed their arguments the other
way around. They started by assuming locality and then
arrived to the conclusion that quantum mechanics was
incomplete [9]. Consequently, the hope was to embed
quantum mechanics into a larger theory which would be
complete and locally causal (the so-called local hidden
variables theories). EPR pairs have later been used in
experiments to discard such a possibility [10]. Quantum
mechanics is thus acknowledged to be non-local in the
sense of Bell, whether or not it is complete. Therefore,
discussing the meaning of non-locality does not require a
priori to introduce EPR pairs. It is sufficient to consider
the simpler example of radioactive decay as we did.
Interpreting non-locality
The usual interpretation of non-locality is fuzzy. If ‘lo-
cal causality’ is indeed a faithful mathematical instantia-
tion of the principle of ‘no superluminal causal influence’,
then its experimental violation should be understood as
the possibility that causes and effects propagate faster
than light. Furthermore, one usually stresses that this
process cannot be used to transmit information, hence no
violation of the principle of ‘no superluminal signalling’,
which would have been in complete contradiction with
special relativity.
However, even the simple idea of superluminal causal
influence is at odds with special relativity. One often
says that the outcome of a measurement in A determines
a later outcome in B, but this can only be a loose way
of speaking because the same ensemble of space-like sep-
arated outcomes in A and B can be equivalently inter-
preted as a measure in A affecting B, or a measure in B
affecting A, depending on the choice of reference frame
specifying a preferred time foliation. The absence of an
absolute time ordering between A and B prevents us from
interpreting the origin of the correlations by a causal in-
fluence from A to B or from B to A, because ‘causation’ is
a time-oriented concept. One could argue in favour of an
absolute reference frame which would justify an absolute
causal orientation, but this hypothesis does not show up
in the phenomenology of the experiments. So, the hypo-
thetical non-local influence between A and B cannot be
causally oriented. At best, it can be thought as a kind
of mutual action at a distance that would enable ‘instan-
taneous’ space-like influence, and so would violate what
was called earlier the principle of ‘no space-like influence’.
Some other interpretations of non-locality argue that
the mere collapse of the wave function would already be
a manifestation of non-locality in ordinary quantum me-
chanics. This is not completely true, because the defi-
nition of Bell is a bit more subtle. In fact, it is true if
one adopts an ontic interpretation of the wave-function,
that is if one regards it as a beable. It is the case, for in-
stance, in Bohmian mechanics. But if one sees the wave-
function only as a mathematical trick, then the so-called
collapse of the wave function does not tell us anything
deep about the local causality of the world. This kind of
fake non-locality is very similar to the apparent superlu-
minal propagation of the potential for Maxwell’s theory
in Coulomb gauge. The same thing also happens for
British sovereignty since the Prince becomes the King as
soon as the Queen dies, however far away in the Universe
he may be. These two examples were exhibited by Bell
himself. In both cases, the thing (the potential or the
sovereignty) that travels faster than light is not a phys-
ical thing. This explains the necessary use of ‘beables’
to define a physically meaningful notion of ‘locality’. By
the way, this remark also discards some interpretations of
non-locality claiming that EPR-type experiments would
force us to choose between ‘locality’ and ‘realism’, for
there is no physically meaningful notion of ‘local causal-
ity’ without the realism of beables.
The definition of local causality is mathematically well-
defined, however its meaning is not obvious because it su-
pervenes on that of beables, which makes it dependent on
the interpretation of quantum mechanics. In the follow-
ing section we are going to see that relational quantum
mechanics can still make sense of this definition, but it
loses on the way most of its surprising features.
III. RELATIONAL LOCAL CAUSALITY
The relational interpretation of quantum mechanics
was proposed in 1995 [4, 11]. First of all, it is a criti-
cism of the usual notion of ‘quantum state’. The ‘state’
should not be taken as an absolute notion, i.e. observer
independent, but rather as a book-keeping device relative
to a specific observer. In this interpretation, the apparent
paradox of Wigner’s friend is taken as evidence that dif-
ferent observers may give different accounts of the same
sequence of events.
4This point of view might be puzzling at first sight
because it challenges the opinion that physical systems
should be describable independently of any observer.
This is surely a departure from strong realism where, for
instance, the property ‘spin up’ belongs to the electron
independently of any observer. Actually, the Kochen-
Specker theorem has already challenged the strongly re-
alistic point of view, showing that a complete set of prop-
erties cannot be consistently attributed to a physical sys-
tem [12]. The relational interpretation challenges strong
realism a bit differently though: there would be no abso-
lute state-property of a physical system at all. However,
this view is not completely anti-realistic, because from
the point of view of a chosen observer, the idea of ‘prop-
erties of a physical system’ makes perfect sense (to the
limit imposed by the Kochen-Specker theorem). Indeed,
it has been recently argued that relational quantum me-
chanics would be an instantiation of ‘structural realism’,
where ‘relations’, rather than ‘objects’, are seen to be the
basic elements of the ontology [13].
Quantum events as relational beables
A priori, it might seem hard to fit the definition of
beables as ‘elements of reality that do not depend on
observation’ in the framework of relational quantum me-
chanics. John Bell certainly intended the beables to be
observer-independent, but relational quantum mechan-
ics does not claim the complete arbitrariness of reality
neither.
We have seen earlier that the explicit content of the
word ‘beable’ was actually given by the peculiar ontol-
ogy of a chosen interpretation. In the relational inter-
pretation, the basic elements of physical reality are the
‘relational quantum events’ [11]. A quantum event is an
interaction between two quantum systems. In this sense,
the relational interpretation gives primacy to ‘relations’
over ‘objects’. A measurement is a special kind of interac-
tion where one of the two systems is macroscopic. Other
kinds of quantum events happen when two quantum sys-
tems entangle through local interaction, and the degrees
of freedom of one become correlated with the degrees of
freedom of the other. Importantly, these quantum events
are themselves ‘relational’ because their mere existence
can only be experienced through their interaction with a
reference observer.
In fact, if one sticks to a particular observer, a rela-
tional beable is nothing but a quantum event. It will not
be as absolute as Bell would have expected, because talk-
ing about ‘quantum events’ still requires us to first fix a
reference observer, but a beable can still be conceived as
an ‘element of reality with respect to the reference ob-
server’. Now, given a reference observer O, the only phys-
ically meaningful beables lie in the past cone of O. Indeed
for O, it is a matter of metaphysical faith to attribute an
existence to events beyond the scope of its practical ex-
perience (future or space-like separated events), but it is
a matter of experimental facts to attribute an existence
to events in its past cone.
Relational local causality
So, which reference observer O shall we choose to re-
formulate the definition of local causality? In order to
reasonably talk of the beables A and B, the reference
observer O should lie in the common future of A and B.
(see Figure 2).
Figure 2: Spacetime diagram showing the localisation of the
relational beables A,B, Λ, N and M , and the observer O with
respect to which they are described.
Then the local causality relation should be rewritten
{a|λ, n, b}O = {a|λ, n}O , (2)
with an O index reminding us of the reference observer.
A violation of this condition means that, from the per-
spective of O, A and B are correlated. You can imagine
O as an experimenter looking at two distant Geiger coun-
ters, in A and B, equipped with a LED which lights up
when they detect an α particle. O would observe that
the light coming from A is switched off whenever the light
from B is switched on, and vice versa. Now, suppose O
also knows all the relevant beables in region Λ and N ,
then he is still unable to predict which of the two Geiger
counters will detect the α particle, but he observes, in-
deed, correlations between A and B, because for consis-
tency, there can be at most one α particle emission. This
is the only observational manifestation of ‘non-locality’.
A common cause
Since A and B are space-like separated, a classical ob-
server O observing correlations between past events A
and B would be lead to the conclusion that there is a
common cause to A and B. And indeed there is one,
namely the radioactive particle in their common past
Λ. Here the notion of ‘common cause’ does not entail
a deterministic evolution for the decay of the radioactive
5particle. In the classical case, the notion of causation is
strongly related to that of determinism, hence the idea
that a complete knowledge of the past would entail a com-
plete knowledge of the future. In quantum mechanics,
there is no such a determinism, not only because there is
no precise meaning of ‘complete knowledge of the past’
(Heisenberg uncertainty), but also because the measure-
ment process is intrinsically probabilistic. Nevertheless,
the intuitive notion of causation does not disappear from
the quantum world: in our example it is still meaningful
to say that the radioactive element is the ‘common cause’
of the correlations observed later, even if one cannot pre-
dict from the past knowledge (Λ, N and M) whether the
α particle will be observed in A or in B. To be clear,
we are here referring to an intuitive notion of ‘common
cause’ and not to the formal notion introduced by Re-
ichenbach [14]. Indeed, his attempt of formalisation is
tied too much to a deterministic context, and so, does
not suit the example of a radioactive decay as was first
pointed out in [15].
Conclusion
Let us recall that the initial goal of Bell was to for-
malise the intuitive idea that ‘causes and effects cannot
go faster than light’ in the context of the indetermin-
ism of quantum mechanics. This aim was thought to be
achieved with the mathematically well-defined notion of
‘local causality’. With this definition indeed, EPR-type
experiments have shown that quantum mechanics is fun-
damentally non-local. What this really means however
depends on the physical content given to beables. Now
we have seen that the relational interpretation of quan-
tum mechanics forces us to reconsider the EPR-type ex-
periments from the perspective of a future observer. As
a consequence, the failure of ‘local causality’ in the sense
of Bell can nevertheless be understood as the existence
of a common cause in an indeterministic context. Surely,
there is no need to appeal to a mysterious space-like sep-
arated influence to understand it.
A possible conclusion is that Bell’s definition of ‘local
causality’ does not capture finely enough the intuitive
idea of an indeterministic ‘no superluminal causal influ-
ence’ as Bell would have liked. Interestingly, Bell himself
seems to have been very conscious of the potential in-
adequacy of his formalisation. Just before asserting his
definition of ‘local causality’, Bell writes very honestly:
Now it is precisely in cleaning up intuitive
ideas for mathematics that one is likely to
throw out the baby with the bathwater. So
the next step should be viewed with the utmost
suspicion. [3]
With the relational interpretation, quantum mechanics
is still ‘non-local’ in the sense of Bell, but it nonethe-
less remains true that ‘causes and effects of events are no
further away than permitted by the velocity of light’. In-
deed, if the observer O sees a light signal from A, he will
think the radioactive particle in the region of the past
cone Λ is the cause of the detection of an α particle in
A. The same thing could be said symmetrically for B.
Neither causes nor effects travel faster than light what-
soever. There are correlations between A and B because
there is a common cause in their common past.
Earlier claims in [5] that relational quantum mechanics
was local were maybe misleading: the relational interpre-
tation is not locally causal in the sense of Bell. However
it should be clear now that this kind of non-locality can-
not be interpreted as a superluminal interaction, and the
relational interpretation is indeed local in all the senses
listed in section I.
Bell did not know about relational quantum mechan-
ics, but he made very clever claims about realism in
[3]. We have already recalled the enlightening examples
about the gauge potential and the British sovereignty,
and Bell uses them to show that conventions can always
travel faster than light. Though it is not clearly stated
in these terms, the idea is already almost there that the
question ‘what cannot go faster than light?’ might be a
relevant criterion to determine what should be considered
as physically real and what should not. With this point of
view, the failure of non-locality could have already been
reinterpreted by Bell as the impossibility to attribute a
relevant physical existence to B from the perspective of
A, and vice versa. This conclusion would have put him
on the way to a relational interpretation, with the idea
that one should rather consider a future observer O to
talk consistently of A and B.
With the relational interpretation, the possible weird-
ness of non-local experiments boils down to the weirdness
of indeterminism. Surely, fundamental randomness is a
characteristic feature of quantum physics; the future is
not completely predictable, even in principle. Although
it contradicts the prejudices of classical physics, random-
ness has been much easier accepted in the literature than
non-locality. A reason may be that the uncertainty of
any measurement already constrains classical physics to
be indeterministic in practice. The shift is that classical
randomness is epistemic (lack of knowledge) while quan-
tum randomness is fundamental (irreducible indetermin-
ism). In fact, ‘non-locality’ exemplifies the difficulty to
understand together ‘causality’ and ‘indeterminism’ in
the same conceptual and mathematical framework.
The relational interpretation has not yet answered all
the intriguing questions raised by quantum mechanics [6].
However, a lot of work has already been achieved in the
recent years, which accounts for an increasing interest in
the approach [16, 17]. Indeed, we believe this interpre-
tation is a very promising framework to think about the
essential features of quantum physics, as we have shown
with the example of non-locality in this article.
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